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1. Introduction 
 
This paper reports descriptive statistics based on the WTO Dispute Settlement Data Set (Ver. 
3.0). The data set contains approximately 67 000 observations on a wide range of aspects of the 
Dispute Settlement (DS) system, and is exclusively based on official WTO documents. It covers 
all 426 WTO disputes initiated through the official filing of a Request for Consultations from 
January 1, 1995, until August 11, 2011, and for these disputes it includes events occurring until 
July 28, 2011.1 In this paper however, we will omit data pertaining to 2011 and only consider the 
full years 1995—2010.  
 
In order to shed some light on differences across WTO Members in participation in the DS 
system, we will divide Members into five groups, as specified in detail in Table 1. Broadly 
speaking, these groups are:  
 
 G2:  The European Union  (EU), and the United States (US) 
 IND:  Other industrialized countries 
 DEV: Developing countries other than LDC 
 LDC: Least developed countries  
 BIC: Brazil, India and China. 
 
The EU is taken to be EU-15, since the enlargements came relatively late during the period we 
cover. For the most part, the choice in this regard makes little difference quantitatively, since 
most of the 12 countries acceding to the EU in 2004 and 2007 have been relatively inactive in the 
WTO. The LDC group corresponds to the list of LDCs prepared by the United Nations. A more 
discretionary line is drawn between IND and DEV. We have classified under IND, OECD 
Members, the non-OECD Members among the 12 countries that most recently became members 
of the EU, those  that are currently at an advanced stage of their accession negotiations, as well 
as countries that are not OECD Members but have a very high per capita income, such as 
Singapore. The DEV group consists of all countries which do not fit into either of the above 
                                                 
1 These correspond to disputes DS1-DS426 in terms of the dispute number assigned by the WTO Secretariat when a 
Request for Consultation is filed. 
  
mentioned categories, and are not BIC countries either. BIC refers to Brazil, India, and China: 
the sheer number of cases in which Brazil, India and China have participated, as well as their 
overall participation in WTO, led us to these three countries as a separate group. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 highlights the evolution of the total use of the DS 
system; Section 3 discusses some aspects of participation of the groups defined above when 
acting as complainants or respondents; Section 4 deals with the subject-matter of disputes; 
Section 5 highlights a few aspects of countries’ success with regard to the legal claims they made 
before panels; Section 6 provides information as to the nationality and the appointment process 
of WTO panelists; Section 7 focuses on the duration of dispute settlement procedures at different 
stages of the adjudication process; Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
  
Table 1: Country classification 
G2	 DEV	cont'd	 DEV	cont'd	
EU	 Cape	Verde	 St	Lucia	
US	 Chile	 Suriname	
	 Chinese	Taipei	 Swaziland	
BIC	 Colombia	 Tanzania	
Brazil	 Congo	 Thailand	
China	 Costa	Rica	 Tonga	
India	 Cuba	 Trinidad	and	Tobago	
	 Côte	d'Ivoire	 Tunisia	
IND	 Dominica	 Ukraine	
Australia	 Dominican	Republic	 United	Arab	Emirates	
Bulgaria	 Ecuador	 Uruguay	
Canada	 Egypt	 Venezuela	
Croatia	 El	Salvador	 Viet	Nam	
Cyprus	 Fiji	 Zimbabwe	
Czech	Republic	 Former	Yugoslav	Republic	of	Macedonia	 	
Estonia	 Gabon	 LDC	
Hong	Kong	‐	China	 Georgia	 Angola	
Hungary	 Ghana	 Bangladesh	
Iceland	 Grenada	 Benin	
Israel	 Guatemala	 Burkina	Faso	
Japan	 Guyana	 Burundi	
Korea	 Honduras	 Cambodia	
Latvia	 Indonesia	 Central	African	Republic	
Liechtenstein	 Jamaica	 Chad	
Lithuania	 Jordan	 Congo,	Democratic	Republic	of	the	
Malta	 Kenya	 Djibouti	
Mexico	 Kuwait	 Gambia	
New	Zealand	 Kyrgyz	Republic	 Guinea	
Norway	 Macao	–	China	 Guinea	Bissau	
Poland	 Malaysia	 Haiti	
Romania	 Mauritius	 Lesotho	
Singapore	 Moldova	 Madagascar	
Slovak	Republic	 Mongolia	 Malawi	
Slovenia	 Morocco	 Maldives	
Switzerland	 Namibia	 Mali	
Turkey	 Nicaragua	 Mauritania	
	 Nigeria	 Mozambique	
DEV	 Oman	 Myanmar	
Albania	 Pakistan	 Nepal	
Antigua	and	Barbuda	 Panama	 Niger	
Argentina	 Papua	New	Guinea	 Rwanda	
Armenia	 Paraguay	 Senegal	
Bahrain	 Peru	 Sierra	Leone	
Barbados	 Philippines	 Solomon	Islands	
Belize	 Qatar	 Tanzania	
Bolivia	 Saint	Vincent	and	the	Grenadines	 Togo	
Botswana	 Saudi	Arabia	 Uganda	
Brunei	Darussalam	 South	Africa	 Zambia	
Cameroon	 Sri	Lanka	 	
	 St	Kitts	and	Nevis	 	
  
2. The use of the DS system 
 
It is natural to begin by examining the overall use of the DS system during its existence. As can 
be seen from Figure 1, except for the increase between 1995 and 1996, there has been a 
pronounced tendency toward fewer complaints for the whole period 1995-2010. The average 
number of disputes per year was 20 during 2001-2010, whereas it was 36.5 during 1995-2000.  
 
Figure 1: The number of initiated disputes per year 
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3. Who are the complainants and respondents? 
 
Who participates in DS proceedings has received considerable attention in the literature. To 
address it, it is necessary to define the notion of “a dispute”. There are various ways in which this 
could be done and there is no single correct method applicable across research interests: the 
appropriate choice depends on the question asked. At the same time, the choice of method may 
importantly affect the outcome of the investigation, since it effectively defines the unit of 
account.  
 
The basic idea behind the approach adopted here, as in some literature, is to view disputes 
between WTO Members at a bilateral level. That is, if two Members are complaining against a 
third Member, we count each one of them as having a “dispute” with the third Member – we will 
count, hence, two “bilateral” disputes in this example. Naturally, all original complainants are 
involved in such bilateral disputes. In many disputes there are also countries that file a Request to 
Join in Consultations. These countries have clear interest in the dispute, but as a general matter, 
it is not clear which side they are on. If they are on the side of the original complainant, it is 
natural to include them among the countries that have a bilateral dispute with the respondent. But 
it is also possible that they are on the side of the respondent, either because they are pursuing 
policies that are similar to the challenged one, or because they are in terms of trade structure on 
the complaining side, but still benefit from the contested measure, or for other reasons. If they 
are on the side of the respondent one would obviously not want to include the joining countries 
among those having a dispute with the respondent. In practice, it seems more common that 
countries that request to join in consultations are on the complaining side. We will follow 
practice in this respect. But, in Table 2, when we consider requests to join in on consultations, 
joining Members are specified separately. Also, in Table 3, we examine whether there is any 
systematic difference with regard to the propensity to join in consultations across country groups.  
 
 
 
Table 2: Participation in consultation stage 
  
Country	
status  Complainant	 %	 Third	party %	 Total %	 Respondent	 %	
BIC	 51  11.4  56  7.6  107  9.0  55  12.3 
DEV	 99  22.1  208  28.1  307  25.9  81  18.1 
G2	 179  40.0  143  19.3  322  27.1  217  48.5 
IND	 117  26.2  328  44.3  445  37.5  94  21.0 
LDC	 1  0.2  5  0.7  6  0.5  0  0.0 
Total	 447  100.0  740  100.0  1187  100.0  447  100.0 
 
Let us start by examining the number of times Members of the five identified groups have 
initiated disputes. As can be seen from Table 2, the G2 countries have complained 179 times. 
With a total of 447 bilateral disputes, this implies the G2 accounts for 40% of the bilateral 
complaints, making it the most active group. IND is second with 117 (26%) bilateral complaints, 
followed by DEV with 99 (22%) bilateral disputes. BIC comes fourth with 51 (11%), and last is 
the group LDC which has complained only 1 time (Bangladesh), that is, in 0. 2% of all bilateral 
disputes.  
 
When looking at total participation during consultations as complainants or as a third party the 
IND countries have been most active with 445 of the 1187 total number of appearances 37%. G2 
countries come second with 332 appearances (27%), and DEV comes in at a close third with 307 
appearances (26%). BIC has a total of 107 (9%), and LDC has been active 6 times (1%).  
 
G2 is the most targeted group of countries and its practices have been challenged 217 times (or 
in 49% of the cases), so G2 countries act as a complainant or a respondent around every other 
dispute. IND follows with 94 (21%), DEV is third with 81 (18%), and BIC had its practices 
disputed 51 times (12%). LDC countries have never acted as respondents. 
 
Finally, comparing participation as complainants and as respondents, we see that the country 
groups tend to participate as often in both roles. But the two extreme groups in this regard are 
IND, which more often complains than responds to complaints, and G2, which plays the opposite 
role of being more targeted by complainants than complaining itself. 
  
Table 3a: Distribution of bilateral complaints over complainant and 
respondent groups 
 
    Status	of	Respondent As	Third	Party	  
  Complainants  BIC  DEV  G2  IND    Grand Total 
G2	 EU  18  14  31  19  82  164 
US  19  13  35  30  61  158 
Total  37  27  64  51  143  322 
               
BIC	 Brazil    3  17  5  17  42 
China      7    13  20 
India  1  2  14  2  26  45 
Total  1  5  38  7  56  107 
               
IND	 Australia  1    4  2  49  56 
Bulgaria          2  2 
Canada  4    24  5  66  99 
Cyprus          2  2 
Czech Republic        1  2  3 
Hong Kong ‐ China        1  5  6 
Hungary        5  3  8 
Iceland          3  3 
Israel          1  1 
Japan  1  2  9  2  73  87 
Korea    1  11  2  14  28 
Malta          2  2 
Mexico  3  6  12    36  57 
New Zealand  1    3  3  25  32 
Norway      4    10  14 
Poland    1    2    3 
Romania          2  2 
Singapore    1      2  3 
Slovak Republic          2  2 
Slovenia          2  2 
Switzerland  1    1  2  17  21 
Turkey    2      10  12 
Total  11  13  68  25  328  445 
  
    Status	of	Respondent	 As	Third	Party	  
DEV	 Complainants  BIC  DEV  G2  IND    Grand Total Antigua and Barbuda      1      1 
Argentina  1  7  6  1  12  27 
Barbados          2  2 
Belize          3  3 
Bolivia          1  1 
Chile   5 4 1 8  18
Chinese Taipei  1    2    9  12 
Colombia    3  2    16  21 
Congo          2  2 
Costa Rica    4  1    10  15 
Cuba          2  2 
Côte d'Ivoire          3  3 
Dominican Republic          8  8 
Ecuador      2  1  13  16 
El Salvador    1      6  7 
Fiji   2  2
Guatemala  1  2  3  2  19  27 
Guyana          2  2 
Honduras    4  3    11  18 
Indonesia    2 2 1 1  6
Jamaica          5  5 
Kenya          2  2 
Malaysia      1    1  2 
Mauritius          2  2 
Nicaragua        1  9  10 
Pakistan    1  2    5  8 
Panama    2  3    7  12 
Peru    1  2    9  12 
Philippines  1  1  1  2  6  11 
Sri Lanka  1  1  2
St Kitts and Nevis          2  2 
St Lucia          3  3 
Swaziland          2  2 
Thailand  0  2  9  2  16  29 
Ukraine    1        1 
Uruguay      1    1  2 
Venezuela      1    4  5 
Viet Nam      1      1 
Zimbabwe          3  3   
Total 5  36 47 11 208  307
 
LDC	 Bangladesh  1        1  2 
Madagascar    2 2
Malawi          2  2 
  
Total  1        5  6 
 
Table 3b: Distribution of bilateral complaints across complainant 
and respondent groups in % 
 
    Respondent 
  %  BIC  DEV G2  IND  Total 
Complainant	
BIC  2.0  9.8  74.5 13.7 100.0 
DEV 5.1  36.4 47.5 11.1 100.0 
G2  20.7  15.1 35.8 28.5 100.0 
IND  9.4  11.1 58.1 21.4 100.0 
LDC  100.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0 
 
 
We now turn to the question of who targets whom. Table 3a shows the distribution of 
complainants over the individual Members of the WTO and Table 3b provides summary views 
of this pattern. It emerges from these Tables that G2 targets chiefly G2 and IND: G2 complaints 
against G2 constitute 36% of its total complaints (64 of 179 complaints) and against IND, 29% 
(51/179). 21% of G2 complaints targets BIC countries (37/179) and 15% are against DEV 
(27/179). 
 
As can be seen from Table 3b, IND, DEV, and BIC target G2 much more often than they target 
any other group: 58% of all IND complaints are directed against G2 (68/117); 48% of all DEV 
complaints concern G2 practices (47/99), and finally 75% of all BIC complaints aim at the G2 
countries (38/51) The majority of bilateral disputes involves thus a G2 country as either a 
complainant or respondent. 
 
  
 
Table 4: Propensity to join complaints rather than to complain 
 
Complainant	 Respondent	 Request	for	consultations	
Request	to	join	
consultations	 Total
Propensity	to	
join	
BIC	
BIC  1  0  1  0.0 
DEV  5  1  6  16.7 
G2  38  52  90  57.8 
IND  7  3  10  30.0 
DEV	
BIC  5  12  17  70.6 
DEV  35  40  75  53.3 
G2  47  143  190  75.3 
IND  11  9  20  45.0 
G2	
BIC 36 49 85 57.6 
DEV  27  27  54  50.0 
G2  63  34  97  35.0 
IND  51  32  83  38.6 
IND	
BIC  11  92  103  89.3 
DEV  13  20  33  60.6 
G2  69  179  248  72.2 
IND  25  35  60  58.3 
 
Table 4 provides information about the extent to which the different groups have become 
complainants in bilateral disputes by participating in the original Request for Consultations. Here 
we observe an asymmetry between G2 and the other groups. In complaints against G2 or IND, 
G2 will more often act as original complainant: only 35% of all G2 complaints against G2, and 
39% against IND, are cases where G2 joined in consultations. However, in the case of 
complaints against DEV, G2 has joined in 50% of its total cases against this group. Hence, the 
EU and the US seem more proactive in trade disputes against developed economies than other 
Members, while they more rarely take the initiative to launch a dispute as original complainant 
against a DEV country.  
 
  
DEV countries, on the other hand, have a high propensity to join in when the target is the G2 (in 
75% of all their complaints against G2, DEV joined in consultations). But DEV countries act 
more often as original complainants when targeting practices of either IND countries or other 
DEV countries. IND countries consistently join in consultations more frequently than they act as 
original complainants, no matter who the target group is. Simplifying somewhat, we can hence 
conclude that IND and DEV countries prefer to join in, whereas the G2 Members prefer to act as 
original complainants. This observation could provide some ammunition to those arguing 
participation is also a function of legal capacity (assuming G2 countries have more privileged 
access to legal resources than IND or DEV). It also seems to give some support to the argument 
that original participation is a function of access to information, as information is more available 
to WTO Members with diversified export trade, and wide networks of commercial attachés: this 
is typically the case of the countries. And of course, it is usually the case that those with 
diversified exports are also those with well developed legal and administrative support.  
  
 
Table 5: Third party participation in panel proceedings 
	 Country	 Freq.	
G2
	 EU  86 
US  76 
Total  162 
IN
D
	
Australia  57 
Canada  68 
Hong Kong  12 
Hungary  2 
Iceland  6 
Israel  3 
Japan  97 
Korea  45 
Mexico  54 
New Zealand  23 
Norway  29 
Poland  1 
Singapore  7 
Switzerland  2 
Turkey  33 
Total  439 
BI
C	
Brazil  54 
China  64 
India  62 
Total  180 
LD
C	
Bangladesh  1 
Benin  1 
Chad  1 
Madagascar  3 
Malawi  3 
Senegal  2 
Tanzania  2 
Total  13 
 
	 Country	 Freq.	
D
EV
	
Argentina  26
Bahrain  1
Barbados  4
Belize  4
Bolivia  1
Cameroon  1
Chile  24
Chinese Taipei  55
Colombia  27
Costa Rica  12
Cuba  16
Côte d'Ivoire  4
Dominica  3
Dominican 
Republic  3
Ecuador  12
Egypt  3
El Salvador  12
Fiji  3
Ghana  1
Grenada  1
Guatemala  17
Guyana  3
Honduras  13
Indonesia  3
Jamaica  7
Kenya  3
Kuwait  1
Malaysia  10
Mauritius  5
Nicaragua  10
Nigeria  1
 
	 Country	 Freq.	
D
EV
	
Pakistan  5
Panama  5
Paraguay  13
Peru  9
Philippines  7
Saudi Arabia  4
Sri Lanka  3
St Kitts and Nevis  3
St Lucia  3
St Vincent and 
the Grenadines  1
Suriname  1
Swaziland  3
Tanzania  1
Thailand  41
Trinidad and 
Tobago  3
Uruguay  4
Venezuela  17
Viet Nam  8
Zimbabwe  1
Total  417
 
 
Table 5 gives data on individual WTO Members’ participation as third parties in Panel 
proceedings. In theory, participation as third parties could be motivated by direct trade interest in 
the dispute, but also by other reasons: general dissatisfaction with case law in the disputed area; 
  
disagreements with the manner in which defendant, complainant and/or both argue a particular 
case; willingness to educate national bureaucracies through ‘light’ participation in disputes etc. 
We use the term ‘light’ participation because third parties, according to the DSU and subsequent 
DS practice, usually participate only in the first meeting with the panel, do not submit anything 
in writing, and if they do, they can address whatever they deem appropriate to address. IND 
emerges as the most often represented group, with 439 of 1211, or 36%, of all appearances as 
third parties in all disputes. DEV is close second, with 417 appearances (34%), followed by BIC 
with 180 appearances (15%), G2 with 162 appearances (13%) and LDC with 13 appearances 
(1%). Note that 27 IND countries account for 36% of all cases, 75 DEV countries for 34% and 
only 3 BIC countries, a group situated between the two groups for a disproportionate 15%. This 
observation ties well with the popular (in WTO circles) idea that Brazil and China especially 
used third party participation (a ‘light’ form of participation as argued above) as means to 
educate their national bureaucracies about the functioning of the WTO DS procedures. 
 
Interestingly, Members across the board have been third parties more often than complainants, 
and 12 Members have appeared as third parties without having appeared as complainants. It is 
noteworthy that all of them belong to the DEV/LDC groups (Dominica, Egypt, Ghana, Grenada, 
Nigeria, Paraguay, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname, Tanzania, Benin, Chad, Senegal).  
 
 
4. Which agreements and provisions have been invoked?  
 
We next turn to the subject-matter of the disputes. We first examine how the total number of 
disputes is distributed across agreements and provisions for the WTO Membership as a whole. 
We then turn to see if any broad pattern can be discerned with regard to the matters being raised. 
 
(i) A view across agreements 
Table 6 provides a broad overview of the total number of invocations of GATT with Annexes, 
GATS with Annexes, and the TRIPs.2 In contrast to in Section 3, where we relied on our notion 
of bilateral complaints, we here use Request for Consultation as our unit of account. An 
                                                 
2 Our abbreviations of official titles of agreements and other decisions appear in the Annex to this paper. 
  
illustration may be warranted: if Art. I GATT, and Art. III GATT have been both invoked in a 
Request for Consultation, we would count this as one invocation of GATT. Furthermore, we 
count it as one invocation, irrespective of the number of Members participating in the original 
Request, and the number of Members joining in at a later stage. Our approach here is justified by 
the question that we seek to address here: in how many disputes has, say, the GATT been 
invoked? If both GATT provision(s) and GATS provision(s) are invoked in a dispute, it will in 
this Table be counted as one GATT invocation and one GATS invocation. Of course, this is by 
no means the only way in which this could be measured.  
 
Table 6: Number of times the GATT, the GATS and the TRIPs and 
their Annexes are invoked in Request for Consultations 
 
Agreement	 Number	of	disputes*	 %	of	total	
GATT and Annexes  777  94.2 
GATS and Annexes  19  2.3 
TRIPs  29  3.5 
Total  825  100 
 
* The GATT Annexes included here are AD, AG, ATC, CV, ILA, ROO, SCM, SG, SPS, TBT, TRIMs, and the 
Enabling Clause. 
 
As can be seen from Table 6, GATT (and the other Annex 1A agreements, that is the agreements 
regulating trade in goods) stands for the vast majority of invocations, or 94% of the total number. 
There are 50% more TRIPs invocations than GATS invocations, but they both dwindle in 
comparison to the invocations of the agreements governing trade in goods. This might prima 
facie look surprising. However, the fact that developing countries enjoyed a long transitional 
period to implement TRIPs, probably explains the few invocations of this agreement. GATS is 
still largely a terra incognita for most trading nations, and it is still debatable whether it has 
generated any meaningful liberalization in trade in services or whether it still serves mainly as 
platform for future liberalization: other things equal, one would expect fewer litigations if 
commitments are shallow than in the opposite case.  
 
  
 
Table 7: Agreements invoked in Requests for Consultations 
Agreement	
Invoked	in	
number	of	
Requests	
Percentages
Percentage	
of	all	
disputes	
GATT	 328  36.2  78.3 
AD	 86  9.5  20.5 
SCM	 86  9.5  20.5 
AG	 59  6.5  14.1 
TBT	 41  4.5  9.8 
WTO	 41  4.5  9.8 
SG	 39  4.3  9.3 
SPS	 38  4.2  9.1 
ILA	 33  3.6  7.9 
TRIPs	 29  3.2  6.9 
TRIMs	 26  2.9  6.2 
GATS	 19  2.1  4.5 
ATC	 16  1.8  3.8 
ChinaAA	 16  1.8  3.8 
CV	 14  1.6  3.3 
DSU	 11  1.2  2.6 
ROO	 7  0.8  1.7 
AGR	 6  0.7  1.4 
Enabling	Clause	 4  0.4  1.0 
GPA	 4  0.4  1.0 
1979Understanding	 1  0.1  0.2 
MDTruth	 1  0.1  0.2 
WTODecNotProc	 1  0.1  0.2 
Total	 906  100.0   
*The number of times various WTO Agreements have been invoked in Request for 
Consultations. No account is taken to how many articles are invoked under each 
agreement. This table is to show the prevalence of agreements in Request for 
Consultation. Also, no account is taken of the number of complainants in the 
dispute.   
. 
 
Table 7 specifies in more detail the WTO agreements that have been invoked. Not surprisingly, 
GATT 1947 completely dominates as the most frequently invoked agreement, accounting for 
roughly a third of all instances. There are then three agreements that between themselves are 
invoked roughly as frequently, all of them Annex 1A Agreements dealing with trade in goods: 
  
AD, SCM and AG. But with 9.5%, 9.5% and 6.5%, respectively, they jointly do not stand for 
more than about a quarter of all invocations. 
 
Tables 8-12 take further steps in disaggregating the data by considering the number of times 
specific provisions have been invoked. Starting with the use of GATT, Table 8 shows that the 
basic non-discrimination principles (Arts. I and III of the GATT) have been invoked in 29% of 
the disputes (231 out of 794 invocations). They are followed by concerns over alleged 
quantitative restrictions, which account for 12% of all GATT disputes (Art. XI, 94/794), and 
concerns over the lawful imposition of duties, which stand for 11% of all GATT disputes (Art. 
II, 84/794) (we disregard Art. XXIII invocations). Consequently, the total number of challenges 
concerning the legality of trade instruments account for 22% of all GATT disputes 
((94+84)/794). The transparency provision (Art. X GATT) emerges as an important concern as 
well: in 10% of all GATT disputes, WTO Members have claimed that had been violated 
(76/794).  
 
Let us next take a look at other agreements, starting in Table 9 with SCM. Challenges against the 
legality of subsidies occupied 28% of all SCM claims (Arts. 3-7, 90 out of 317 claims), whereas, 
challenges against the legality of imposition of CVDs, 45% (Arts. 10-23, 142/317). The first 
category can be further broken down: 17% of all SCM claims concerned prohibited subsidies 
(Arts. 3 and 4, 54/317); 11% concerned actionable subsidies (Arts. 5-7, 36/317). Finally, 16% of 
all SCM claims concerned the constitutive elements of the subsidy-definition in the SCM (Arts. 
1 and 2, 51/317). 
 
Table 10 provides a breakdown for the AD agreement. The most frequently invoked provision 
concern the definition of the dumping margin (Art. 2; 62 invocations; 12% of all invocations), 
evidence (Art. 6; 58; 11%), the investigation (Art. 5; 53; 10%), injury (Art. 3; 54; 10%), 
principles (Art. 1; 52; 10%), and transparency obligations (Art. 12; 41; 10%). 
 
Table 11 breaks down invocations of the GATS, showing that its various provisions have been 
very sparsely invoked. Consequently, it is probably premature to draw any inferences from 
practice so far. But for what it is worth, we can point to two features: 52% of all claims concern 
  
specific commitments (Arts. XVI, XVII and XVIII, 33/64); 41% of all claims concern alleged 
violations of the non-discrimination principle (Arts. II and XVII, 26/64), where the National 
Treatment clause has been invoked almost twice as often as the Most Favored Nation clause.  
 
Finally, the overall number of TRIPs invocations is as noticed above, relatively small. When 
invoked, the particular provisions mentioned in the Requests for Consultation tend to be 
remarkably evenly spread across the various provisions of the agreement, as demonstrated in 
Table 8e. But three provisions stand out as the most frequently invoked: 10% of all TRIPs claims 
concern transitional arrangements (Art. 65, 14/ 147), 7% concern the existing subject matter 
(Art. 70, 11/ 147), and a further 7% the patentable subject matter (Art. 27, 10/ 147). 
 
  
 
Table	8:	GATT:	Number	of	
times	invoked	in	disputes
	 	
Table	9:	SCM	:	Number	of	
times	invoked	in	
disputes	
Table	10:	AD	:	Number	of	
times	invoked	in	disputes	
 
GATT	
Article	 Frequency*	
I	 106 
II	 84 
III	 125 
IV	 1 
IX	 2 
V	 8 
VI	 74 
VII	 9 
VIII	 12 
X	 76 
XI	 94 
XIII	 34 
XIX	 38 
XV	 2 
XVI	 9 
XVII	 7 
XVIII	 7 
XX	 6 
XXI	 2 
XXIII	 79 
XXIV	 8 
XXIVInt	 1 
XXVIII	 7 
ProcXXVIII	 1 
UndII	 1 
UndXXVIII	 1 
Total	 794 
 
SCM
Article Frequency*
1	 30 
2	 21 
3	 48 
4	 6 
5	 15 
6	 16 
7	 5 
9	 1 
10	 29 
11	 20 
12	 11 
13	 4 
14	 13 
15	 11 
16	 2 
17	 9 
18	 2 
19	 18 
20	 2 
21	 12 
22	 9 
25	 1 
27	 8 
28	 2 
30	 1 
32	 19 
Annex	I 2 
Total	 317 
 
AD	
Article	 Frequency*
1	 52 
2	 62 
3	 54 
4	 20 
5	 53 
6	 58 
7	 22 
8	 4 
9	 37 
10	 7 
11	 24 
12	 41 
15	 6 
16	 1 
17	 3 
18	 40 
19	 1 
Annex	I	 5 
Annex	II	 30 
Total	 520 
 
  
 
 
Table	11:	GATS	:	Number	of	times	
invoked	in	disputes	
 
Table	12:	TRIPs:	Number	of	times	invoked	
in	disputes	
GATS	
Article	 Frequency*	
I	 1 
II	 9 
III	 3 
IV	 1 
VI	 8 
VIII	 2 
XI	 1 
XVI	 12 
XVII	 17 
XVIII	 4 
XXIII	 3 
TRP	 1 
AnnMovPers	 1 
AnnTelecoms	 1 
Total	 64 
 
 
TRIPs
Article Frequency*
1	 2 
2	 6 
3	 7 
4	 4 
7	 1 
8	 1 
9	 5 
10	 2 
11	 2 
12	 2 
13	 2 
14	 5 
15	 1 
16	 3 
17	 1 
18	 1 
19	 1 
20	 3 
21	 1 
22	 2 
24	 2 
27	 10 
28	 6 
31	 3 
33	 3 
34	 1 
39	 3 
41	 8 
42	 5 
46	 1 
49	 2 
 
 
TRIPs	
Article	 Frequency*
50	 5 
51	 2 
52	 1 
53	 1 
54	 1 
55	 1 
58	 1 
59	 2 
61	 4 
62	 2 
63	 6 
65	 14 
70	 11 
Total	 147 
 
* The number of times various articles have been 
invoked in the Request for Consultations by the 
original 
Complainants. An Article is counted only once even 
if referred to several times. Hence, if for instance 
SCM or AD, Arts. 3.1 and 3.2 have been both 
invoked, the Table counts this as one invocation of 
Art. 3. Equivalently, if for instance GATT Art. III.1 
and III.2 have been both invoked; the Table counts 
this as one invocation of Art. III.	
  
 
(ii) The pattern of complainants/respondents for select agreements and subject matters 
Tables 13a and 13b provide information on the invocation of five agreements (GATT, AD, 
SCM, GATS, TRIPs) broken down on the 16 possible constellations of complainant 
group/respondent group. The two Tables contain the same information, but exhibited in slightly 
different manner. In Table 13a the categorization is by country classification of the complainant, 
while in Table 13b of the respondent. 
 
Tables 13a and b show that, with regard to the GATT, G2 dominates as complainant in absolute 
numbers with 125 (bilateral) invocations, followed by 98 for IND, and 86 for DEV (we disregard 
LDC in this discussion since the impact of this groups is marginal). G2 has been the main target 
of GATT complaints, having been so almost three times more often than IND and DEV (171 
invocations compared to 64 and 65 respectively) The role of the GATT for IND as a complainant 
and G2 as a respondent can be seen from the fact that complaints by IND against G2 account for 
17% (60/347) of all GATT complaints and 61% of all GATT complaints by IND. IND has thus 
launched the most complaints against G2. G2 has also been frequently targeted by DEV and G2 
with around 12% of GATT complaints have been between US - EU and DEV countries (42/347 
and 40/347, respectively). 
 
  
Table 13a: Invocation of agreements by complainant and 
respondent group* 
 
Complainant	 Respondent	 AD	 GATS	 GATT	 SCM	 TRIPs	
             
BIC	
BIC  1    1     
DEV  2    3  1   
G2  15    30  11  3 
IND  2 3 3 
Total  20    37  15  3 
	            
DEV	
BIC  3    5  1   
DEV  7  1  32     
G2  10  7  40  5   
IND  2  1  9     
Total  22  9  86  6   
	            
G2	
BIC  3  5  31  10  5 
DEV  2    20  5  4 
G2  8  4  42  18  10 
IND  5 4 32 12  5
Total  18  13  125  45  24 
	            
IND	
BIC    1  9  5   
DEV  9    10  1   
G2  24  2  60  20  2 
IND  1  1  19  3   
Total  34  4  98  29  2 
	            
LDC	 BIC  1    1     Total  1    1     
  Grand Total  95  26  347  95  29 
* The number of times five major WTO Agreements have been invoked in Request for Consultations, by country group. 
Includes all bilateral disputes with both original member countries. 
 
The prime target of AD complaints in among the country groups has been G2 with a total of 57 
invocations or 60% (57/95), where IND has been the most active invoker against G2 with 24 
invocations out of 95 or 25%. There have been relatively few invocations of TRIPs and the 
majority of such claims have been raised by G2 with a total of 24 or 83% (24/26) of all TRIPs 
invocations. G2 have also been the main target of TRIPs with a total of 15 invocations or 52% 
  
and then primarily by other G2, in practice disputes between EU – US. A similar pattern can be 
seen with respect to SCM complaints: 57% (54/95) of all such complaints are directed against 
G2; here, G2 and DEV share the burden as complainants equally, accounting for, respectively,  
19% (18/95) and 21% (20/95) of all complaints. 
 
As we have already seen, there are very few GATS disputes. Examining the few invocations that 
have occurred, G2 has been the most targeted with a total of 13 or 50% (13/26) of all GATS 
invocations. The main complainant group has been DEV with 7 invocations.  
 
Table 13b: Invocation of agreements by respondent and 
complainant group* 
 
Respondent	 Complainant	 AD	 GATS	 GATT	 SCM	 TRIPs	
             
BIC	
BIC  1    1     
DEV  3 5 1 
G2  3  5  31  10  5 
IND    1  9  5   
LDC  1    1     
Total  8  6  47  16  5 
	            
DEV	
BIC  2    3  1   
DEV  7  1  32     
G2  2    20  5  4 
IND  9    10  1   
Total  20  1  65  7  4 
	            
G2	
BIC  15 30 11  3
DEV  10  7  40  5   
G2  8  4  42  18  10 
IND  24  2  60  20  2 
Total  57  13  172  54  15 
	            
IND	
BIC  2    3  3   
DEV  2  1  9     
G2  5  4  32  12  5 
IND  1 1 19 3 
Total  10  6  63  18  5 
  
  Grand Total  95  26  347  95  29 
 
* The number of times five major WTO Agreements have been invoked in Request for Consultations, by country group. 
Includes all bilateral disputes with both original member countries. 
 
Table 14: Invocation of agreements by third party group 
 
Third	party	 AD	 GATS	 GATT SCM	 TRIPs	 Total	
BIC	 18  0  51  14  6  89 
DEV	 17  18  193  52  7  287 
G2	 16  8  118  28  12  182 
IND 30  3  304  68  47  452 
LDC	 0  0  4  4  0  8 
Total 81  29  670  166  72  1018 
 
Table 14 identifies the agreements being invoked in cases where third parties have joined the 
process. As expected, GATT issues have been unparalleled in attracting countries to join: 640 
third parties or 63% of all third parties have appeared in cases where the GATT has been 
invoked. IND has been quite active in this process.  
 
 
5. Winners and losers of legal claims 
 
The data set contains information on the legal claims made by the parties and on whether 
adjudicating bodies have accepted these claims or not. In this Section, we will take a brief look at 
some of these data.3  
 
A few preliminary comments are required. The “unit of account” in the analysis is legal claims, 
as defined in the WTO case law on Art. 6.2 DSU: a legal claim comprises a factual matter and 
the legal provision that it allegedly violates. We are only concerned with the panel stage, and 
whether claims are won or not. We follow the evolution of the EU membership in the sense that 
up to January 1, 2004 EU is EU-15, after that date EU-25. In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania 
                                                 
3 Hoekman et al (2007) provides a more detailed account, but based on older data. 
  
joined, further expanding EU to EU-27. Both have previously been active in the WTO dispute 
settlement, Bulgaria as third party during consultations and Romania as defendant.   
 
There are in total 176 bilateral disputes with the definition just mentioned, involving a total of 
2,979 legal claims. Table 15 shows how these are distributed across pairs of complaining and 
responding Members, grouped by their country status. The IND group has raised almost half 
(42%) of all the claims but only been the target of 15% of all claims. G2 seems to have been the 
most targeted country group where 75% of all claims raised have been against G2. However, G2 
is only second to IND in raising claims where one third (27%) of all claims has been raised by 
G2. BIC and DEV have almost equal share in raising claims with around 15% of all claims. 
Though DEV have been more targeted, this is to be expected since there are more countries 
belonging to the DEV group than BIC. 
 
Table 16 depicts for each pair (complainant group, respondent group) the average number of 
claims. There is significant variation, both for each complainant group across respondents, and 
for each respondent group across complainants. At the lower end, a G2 complaint against a DEV 
country on average involves around 4 claims, while an IND complaint against a G2 country on 
average comprises almost 29 claims. Note however, that the average number of claims between 
DEV complainant and IND respondent is 52 claims but comprise of only two cases and BIC 
complaint against DEV country is 31 claims but this reflects only one case. So care should be 
taken with these averages. 
Table 15: Distribution of number of legal claims by group pairing 
    Respondent	(PANEL)	
    BIC DEV G2  IND Total 
Complainant	
(PANEL)	
BIC    31  403  27  461 
DEV  4  78  262  105 449 
G2  67  30  491  220 808 
IND 17 76 1088 80 1261 
Total 88  215  2244 432 2979 
 
Table 16: Average number of claims within each group pairing 
  
    Respondent	(PANEL)	
  BIC DEV G2 IND
Complainant
(PANEL)	
BIC    31.0 20.2 9.0 
DEV 4.0 15.6 11.9 52.5
G2  6.1 3.8  18.9 9.2 
IND 8.5 12.7 28.6 11.4
 
The distribution of the claims across agreements is shown in Table 17. Disregarding the GATT 
provision the majority of claims are under the three contingent protection instruments AD, CVD, 
and SG. 
Table 17: The distribution of claims across agreements/provisions 
Agreements/provisions No.	of	claims
AD	   841 
AG	   47 
ATC	   13 
DSU:	 3.7	 2 
GATS	   30 
GATT:	 I	 26 
GATT:	 II	 117 
GATT:	 III	 102 
GATT:	 VI	 88 
GATT:	 X	 63 
GATT:	 XI	 27 
GATT:	 XIII	 12 
GATT:	 XIX	 69 
GATT:	 XX	 37 
SCM	   401 
SG	   580 
SPS	   313 
TBT	   14 
TRIPs	   70 
WTO:	 XVI	 33 
 
  
The outcomes of the cases are classified in the data set on the basis of the findings by WTO 
adjudicating bodies as they appear in the ‘Conclusions and Recommendations’ Section of each 
panel report. We classify outcomes into three groups: (1) claims where the complainant 
prevailed; (2) claims where the defendant prevailed; and (3) a residual group of claims where the 
outcome is unclear. The last category has been included despite the fact that in principle a panel 
should either find for or against a claim by a complainant. But practice has made inclusion of this 
third category a necessity:  a typical example would be exercise of judicial economy by panels.  
 
For Table 18, the average number of successful claims is calculated by simply dividing the total 
number of successful claims (“wins”) for a given group by the total number of claims made by 
the group for a specific pairing. It can be noted that overall success rates are remarkably similar 
for the four active groups: when acting as complainants, G2, IND, BIC and DEV win around 
60% of the claims they advance, when calculated as a share of all the claims each group makes. 
Similarly, the total win percentage for the four complainant groups ranges between 53% and 
64% of all the claims they advance. But the Table also reveals a significant variability across 
different complainant-respondent constellations. Most successful are G2 and DEV countries 
when complaining against DEV, winning around 83% of the claims. At the other end of the 
spectrum we find that the DEV group wins less than 29% of the claims that its members advance 
against IND.  
 
Table 18: Average percentage successful claims by group pairing, 
based on the sum of all claims for the pairing 
 
    Respondent	(PANEL) 
  %  BIC  DEV G2  IND  Total % wins 
Complainant	
(PANEL) 
BIC    64.5 54.3 37.0 54.0 
DEV  0  83.3 56.1 28.6 53.9 
G2  71.6 83.3 61.9 62.7 63.7 
IND  82.4 47.4 54.3 68.8 55.2 
Total % losses 70.5 67.9 56.2 53.9 57.1 
 
 
  
 
 
6. The panelists 
 
Table 19 provides data on the nationality of individuals that have served as panelists (chair + non 
chair) in the 199 Panels in the data set; since each panel is composed by three panelists – the data 
set contains a total of 597 panelist-slots. A striking feature in this context is that individuals 
originating in IND and DEV have appeared as panelists (chair, non chair) in 489/597 times, that 
is, in almost 82% of all times. 51 different nationalities have been represented, which means that 
more than two-thirds of all WTO Members have never had a panelist. On 59 occasions a G2 
citizen has acted as panelist (chairman + non chairman). This is less than 10% of all panelists 
used. The US tops the list in this category with 14 times (9 of which chair). US citizens account 
for 14/59 panelists, that is, less than 25% of the total G2 representation. Germany comes second 
with 10 (2 chair), and Sweden third with 9 (8 chair) panelists.  
 
54% of all panelists come from IND, the largest representation in this context. New Zealand tops 
the list with 57 (21 chair), and Switzerland comes second with 48 (24 chair). Australia is third 
with 34 (3 chair). 27% of all panelists come from DEV.  Chile tops the list with 25 (of which 3 
chair) followed by South Africa with 22 (6 chair) and Venezuela with 18 (4 chair). 9% of all 
panelists come from India or Brazil (BIC) where India has been most frequent as panelist with 30 
(of which 10 chair) closely followed by Brazil with 22 (5 as chair).  
 
Table 20 shows that the composition of panels has been decided exclusively by agreement 
between the parties to the dispute on 73 (of a total of 199) occasions. Much more common has 
been for the DG to appoint the panel as per Art. 8.7 DSU; this has occurred on 126 occasions. 
This does not mean, however, that on each of these occasions the DG has appointed all three 
panelists; it could well be the case that the DG appointed only two, or even one panelist.  
  
Table 19: Distribution of panelists by nationality and function 
G2
 
Country  Chair	 Non‐Chair
BI
C	
Country	 Chair	 Non‐Chair	
Austria  0  1  Brazil  5  17 
Belgium  1  4  India  10  20 
Finland  1  4  Total BIC  15  37 
France  0  2       
Germany  2  8  	   	 	
Ireland  0  3 
D
EV
	
Country  Chair	 Non‐Chair	
Italy  0  1  Argentina  4  7 
Netherlands  0  1  Chile  3  22 
Sweden  8  1  Colombia  5  9 
United States  9  6  Costa Rica  4  1 
United Kingdom  0  7  Ecuador  0  3 
Total G2  21  38  Egypt  7  4 
	       Indonesia  0  3 
IN
D
	
Country  Chair	 Non‐Chair Jamaica  0  3 
Australia  3  31  Malaysia  0  2 
Bulgaria  0  1  Mauritius  0  2 
Canada  10  22  Morocco  2  0 
Czech Republic  4  7  Pakistan  3  7 
Hong Kong ‐ China  16  3  Panama  0  1 
Hong Kong  0  2  Philippines  3  4 
Hungary  0  2  South Africa 6  16 
Iceland  8  2  Thailand  0  8 
Israel  0  11  Venezuela  4  14 
Japan  1  12  Total DEV  53  112 
Switzerland  24  24         
Taiwan  0  1         
Total IND  110  211      Frequency  Percent (%) 
            BIC  52  8.7 
            DEV  165  27.6 
            G2  59  9.8 
            IND  321  53.8 
            Total  597  99.9 
  
Table 20: Composition of panels by the parties or the DG, and the 
respondent’s country status 
 
  	 Respondent	 	 	
	 BIC  DEV G2 IND Total % Total
DG	 15  17  71  23  126  63.3 
Parties	 4  13  38  18  73  36.7 
Total	 19  30  109  41  199  100.0 
 
Table 21 shows the propensity for panelists to serve more than once. As can be seen, a total of 
269 individuals have served as panelist in 199 panel proceedings so far. 133 individuals served 
only panelist, whereas 138 individuals served at least twice. Hence, more than 50% of the 
panelists have served more than once. 24 out of 269, that is, 9%, have served 5 times or more. 
The record is held by Mohan Kumar from India, who served on 14 occasions, followed by 
Michael Cartland (Hong Kong, China, 11) and Wilhelm Meier (Switzerland, 11). Panelists who 
have served 10 times are Claudia Orozco (Colombia), Crawford Falconer (New Zealand), Enie 
Neri de Ross (Venezuela), Maamoun Abdel-Fattah (Egypt), Margaret Liang (Singapore), Ole 
Lundby (Norway) and Peter Palecka (Czech Republic). 
  
 
Table 21: Repeat panelists 
Number	of	panels	that	the	
panelist	has	served	on	 Chair	 Non‐Chair	
Total	no.	of	
panelists	 Cumulative
1	 38  93  131  131 
2	 16  46  62  124 
3	 4  26  30  90 
4	 9  13  22  88 
5	 3  5  8  40 
6	 3  3  6  36 
7	 3    3  21 
8	 2  2  4  32 
10	   1  1  10 
11	 1    1  11 
14	   1  1  14 
Total	 79  190  269  597 
 
  
 
7. The duration of the process 
 
Table 22 provides some simple data on the duration of the various stages of the DS process. 
Starting with the bilateral leg of the process -- consultations -- we observe that their average 
length is 164.6 days. Recall that 60 days after the initiation of the consultation process, the 
complainant can request establishment of a Panel, if consultations up to that point were 
unsuccessful. Since the length of the consultations process depends solely on the will of the 
consulting parties, one cannot talk of delays etc. Moreover, complainants might prefer to invest 
additional time at the consultation-stage if they are relatively sure that they can reach a 
conclusion at this stage and avoid going through the remaining cumbersome process (panel, AB, 
compliance panel, compliance AB, arbitration to define reasonable period of time, arbitration to 
decide on the request for countermeasures). Leaving the consultation-stage aside, one can 
compare the statutory deadlines and the de facto duration of all other stages in the WTO DS 
process. One should be careful, nevertheless, not to attribute responsibility for delays to the 
institution without further examination: the process can slow down because of the parties as well.  
 
Table 22: Average length of various phases of the DS process 
Average	length	of	process	 Days	 Statutory	deadline	 Explanation	
Consultations	 164.6 days (5.5 months) 
60 days 
(2 months) 
From the date of Request for 
Consultations until the date the 
Panel was established. 
Panel	 444.9 days (14.7 months)
180  days 
(6  months) 
From the date the Panel was 
established until the date of the 
circulation of the Panel Report. 
Appellate	Body	 90.3 days (3 months) 
60 days 
(2 months) 
From the date of the Notice of 
Appeal until the date of the 
circulation of the Appellate Body 
report. 
RPT	when	agreed	bilaterally	 9.29 months    The average RPT awarded by the arbitrator in the awards circulated. 
RPT	when	awarded	by	arbitrator	 11.7 months   
Total length of agreed period 
between parties of RPT during which 
implementation must occur. 
  
Compliance	Panel	 253.0 days (8.3 months) 
90 days 
(3 months) 
From the date of the request to 
establish a first compliance panel 
until the date of circulation of the 
Compliance Panel Report. 
AB	Compliance	 87.6 days (2.9 months)   
From the date of the first Notice of 
Appeal until the date of circulation 
of the Appellate Body compliance 
report. 
 
 
 
Table 23: Duration of the consultation stage (mean number of days) 
by complainant and respondent group 
 
	 	 Respondent	
	 	 BIC  DEV  G2  IND  Total 
Complainant	
BIC 
 
153.5 145.9 402.7 171.2 
DEV  107.0 104.7 122.3 238.5 128.6 
G2  227.2 137.4 195.2 166.4 183.9 
IND  114.0 205.0 161.7 151.8 161.3 
Total  199.4 134.7 160.3 183.7 164.6 
 
 
Breaking down the average length of consultations by country group pairings, it does not vary 
much between group pairs. Countries with disputes that proceed to the Panel stage remain in 
consultations around 5 to 6 months. The only exception is when BIC has initiated dispute with 
IND, where the average duration has been around 13 months for the three cases in this group.  
 
Figures 2-4 display the variation in terms of process length for the consultation stage, the Panel 
stage, and the AB stage, respectively. In each Figure the disputes are ordered vertically 
according to increasing process length. 
 
Turning to the Panel stage, the statutory duration of the panel process is 6 months or around 180 
days. This deadline for completion of the process can be extended to 9 months (around 270 
days), if need be, but the DSU seems to suggest (Art. 12.9) that this period should not be 
extended any further. The average panel process of the disputes reflected in the data is 445 days, 
  
that is, around 15 months. The data underlying Figure 3 shows that the panel process had been 
completed within the statutory limits in only 10 instances. At the other end there are 42 disputes 
with duration of over 500 days.  
 
Figure 2: Duration of the consultation stage (days) 
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Finally, examining the duration of the Appellate Body (AB) process, we first note that the 
statutory deadline for its completion is 60 days, but with the possibility to extend it to 90 days. 
De facto, the AB manages to complete its work within this deadline: the average duration is 90.3 
days. On 113 out of 127 occasions, that is, 89% of the total number, the AB completed its work 
within 91 days. In 6 cases the AB completed its work within the statutory deadline of 60 days 
and there are only 13 disputes where the AB process exceeded 90 days.  
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3: Duration of Panel stage (days) 
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
D
is
pu
te
s 
or
de
re
d 
by
 d
ur
at
io
n
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
70
0
80
0
90
0
10
00
11
00
12
00
13
00
14
00
15
00
16
00
17
00
18
00
19
00
Duration in days
 
 
Figure 4: Duration of the AB stage (days) 
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Compliance panels (Art. 21.5 DSU) have to observe a statutory 90 days-deadline. They can, 
however, take a longer time, if need be. Contrary to what is the case under Art. 12.9 DSU, Art. 
21.5 DSU does not provide for a maximum delay of the process. Compliance panels enjoy some 
flexibility when deciding the time for completion of the process. In practice, they take on 
average 253 days or around 8 months to complete their work. The AB completes its work even 
faster when discussing an appeal against a compliance panel report (Art. 21.5 DSU) than when 
adjudicating an appeal against an ordinary panel report: on average it does so within 88 days 
(around 3 months). 
 
Finally, Table 22 also yields information on the average reasonable period of time (RPT) for 
implementation of the WTO adjudicating bodies’ recommendations/suggestions. The RPT has in 
practice been determined either through agreement between the parties, or through recourse to an 
Arbitrator. There are no statutory deadlines imposing a time-frame during which parties to a 
dispute must reach an agreement as to the extent of the RPT, so the type of analysis undertaken 
above cannot be repeated for the bilateral determination of RPTs. There is a statutory deadline 
that the Arbitrator must respect (Art. 21.3c). This is not, however, an interesting feature of the 
process and in what follows we focus on the length of the RPT that the Arbitrator has awarded, 
rather than ask the question whether he/she has respected the statutory deadlines when 
determining its extent. It should be noted that the DSU (Art. 21.3c) provides a guideline to the 
Arbitrator when it comes to fixing the RPT: it should not be longer than 15 months. The DSU 
acknowledges, however, that the RPT can extend beyond 15 months if need be. 
 
What can be done, however, is to compare the awarded RPT depending on whether it is 
determined through a bilateral agreement or through arbitration. As reported in the Table, the 
average length of bilaterally RPT is 9 months, while the average RPT fixed by the Arbitrator is 
12 months. Hence, the average RPT is significantly shorter when determined by the parties than 
by the Arbitrator.  
 
  
8. Instead of conclusions 
 
In the above we have presented a number of observations concerning various aspects of the DS 
system, as it has left an imprint in our data set. We have merely displayed this data, without any 
attempt at statistically explaining why the data looks the way it does. Nor have we presented any 
benchmark against which to compare whether countries are over- or under-represented in the 
system, or whether it is working satisfactory in other respects. It is therefore impossible to draw 
any firm conclusions from the above – it is only meant to serve as food for further thought. There 
are a couple of features that we find somewhat striking in this regard.  
 
A first observation, and there is no surprise here, is the almost complete absence of the large 
LDC group. One could add to this group a large number of countries in DEV that have never 
been active neither as participants in disputes, nor in the adjudication process. It is therefore hard 
to escape the conclusion that a large fraction of the WTO Membership is passive as it comes to 
the WTO DS system. 
 
A second observation is the, to our mind, surprisingly high participation rate by the DEV group. 
It should be recalled here that we have classified as IND several countries that would in the 
WTO be treated as developing countries; this includes, for instance, Hong Kong – China, Korea, 
Mexico and Turkey. These are all countries that are relatively active in the DS system. Despite 
having excluded them from the DEV group, the latter nevertheless appear as a significant player, 
the way this is measured here. 
 
Our third observation is a defence for introducing the BIC group: the three countries are 
‘officially’ developing countries but are now active members (two of them, Brazil, India) of the 
new Quad (along with the EU, and the US) whereas all three join the G2 in the informal G5 
group, which has been playing a prominent role in the negotiation of the Doha round. In dispute 
settlement, their numbers, as reflected many times in this paper, differ (and sometimes, 
dramatically) from those of DEV countries. The BIC group is emerging as a key player in the 
WTO DS procedures.  
 
  
Our final, observation is that the G2 group is less dominant as complainant than we would have 
guessed. It tends to be much more often the subject of complaints, than a complaining party, and 
G2 has had a very low share of all panelists. This is not to take a stand on the “weight” of these 
countries in the organization, but just to point out how our numbers come out. 
  
ANNEX:  List of abbreviations employed in the paper 
AD Agreement on Implementation of Art. VI of GATT 1994 (antidumping) 
AG Agreement on Agriculture 
ATC Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
ChinaAA China Accession Agreement 
CV Agreement on Implementation of Art. VII of GATT 1994 (customs valuation) 
EnC Enabling Clause 
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GPA Agreement on Government Procurement 
IL Illustrative List (annexed to the TRIMs) 
ILA Agreement on Import-Licensing Procedures 
MDTruth Ministerial Decision Regarding Cases Where Customs Administrations 
    Have Reasons To Doubt The Truth Or Accuracy Of Declared Value  
ROO Agreement on Rules of Origin 
SG Agreement on Safeguards 
SCM Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
SPS Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures  
TBT Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
TRIMs Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures 
TRIPs Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights 
TRP Telecoms Reference Paper (GATS) 
1979Und 1979 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and 
Surveillance 
